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The Hyper-Personalization of War
Cyber, Big Data, and the Changing Face of Conflict
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
“You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” 
Leon Trotsky 
For those who participate in it, all war can seem “hyper-per-
sonalized.”  But advances in cyber technology have enabled 
personalization to literally be taken to a whole new level, and 
this capability may make the role of cyber in future conflicts 
rather different than what is conceived today.  
Popular conceptions of “cyber war” conjure up apocalyp-
tic visions of aircraft crashing into each other due to disabled 
air traffic control systems, entire cities darkened as result of 
a computer breakdowns, and even nuclear plants melting 
down because of misdirected computerized instructions. 
These are the kind of incidents former Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta warned about in 2012 speech.  According to 
Panetta, he feared a “cyber Pearl Harbor” that “would para-
lyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense 
of vulnerability.   Likewise, President Obama characterized 
the cyber threat as “one of the most serious economic and 
national security challenges we face as a nation.”1  
Yet, increasing numbers of scholars are questioning that 
premise.  In 2012, Professor Thomas Rid argued in an arti-
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cle entitled “Cyber War Will Not Take 
Place” that cyberwar has never hap-
pened, is not happening, and is “highly 
unlikely” to occur in the future.2 Simi-
larly, researchers Jerry Brito and Tate 
Watkins contended in 2012 that the 
evidence of an imminent cyber catas-
trophe is scant.  While conceding that 
“cyberattacks and cyberespionage are 
real and serious concerns,” that state-
ment “is not evidence that we face a 
grave risk of national catastrophe.”3   
More recently, authors Bill Blunden 
and Violet Cheung claim in their new 
book, Behold a Pale Farce: Cyber War, Threat 
Inflation, and That Malware Industrial Complex, 
that the cyber threat has been overhyped 
for the purpose, they say, of making 
the public “so apprehensive and uneasy 
[about the cyber threat] they’ll accept 
any solution to feel safe again.”4  
Less histrionically, the New York 
Times reports that prior to operations 
in Libya in 2010, the United States 
considered employing cyber method-
ologies against Gadhafi’s military, but 
ultimately rejected it in part due to the 
sheer difficulty in doing so.  The Times 
observed that although “popular fiction 
and films depict cyberattacks as easy to 
mount…in reality it takes significant 
digital snooping to identify potential 
entry points and susceptible nodes.” 
Even then, writing and inserting the 
“proper poisonous codes” is challeng-
ing.5 
This article suggests that our under-
standing of the potential permuta-
tions of cyber war may be incomplete. 
Assuming that cyber means will inexo-
rably impact the characteristics of war in 
the 21st century, it argues that the grow-
ing capabilities of cyber methodologies 
may find a different application in 
armed conflict than popularly assumed. 
In particular, “Big Data” technologies 
mainly intended for commercial uses 
enable not only the acquisition and 
archiving of vast amounts of data, but 
also empower a radically enhanced abil-
ity for rapid analysis.  The convergence 
of these technologies will permit what 
might be called “the hyper-personaliza-
tion of war.” 
The Technological Environ-
ment. 21st century conflicts will take 
place in an environment defined by 
enormous advances in information 
technologies.  Though most realize that 
the number of people active in cyber-
space has grown considerably, the actual 
figures can still be surprising.  
For example, since the year 2000, 
the number of Internet users has grown 
566%.6 Significantly, this growth is 
not just in the developed world.  The 
International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) reports that by “the end 
of 2014, there will be almost 3 billion 
Internet users, with two-thirds of them 
coming from the developing world.” 
Furthermore, ITU says “the number of 
mobile-broadband subscriptions will 
reach 2.3 billion globally,” adding, “[f]
ifty-five percent of these subscriptions 
are expected to be in the developing 
world.”7   
Equally important is the enormous 
amount of data available in cyberspace. 
In a 2012 estimate, “90% of the world’s 
data was created in the last two years 
alone.”8  In fact, 2.5 quintillion bytes of 
data is created each day, which is “more 
data than was seen by everyone since the 
beginning of time.”9  Facebook users 
alone upload over 350 million images 
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per day.10  As those millions of images 
indicate, there is a huge amount of 
personal information accessible online.
The loosely defined term for today’s 
massive data sets is “Big Data.”11  Because 
of its potential to revolutionize how 
goods are sold, it is almost impos-
sible to overstate the impact of the rise 
of “Big Data” on global commerce. 
Recognizing “Big Data’s” potential to 
personalize marketing efforts to a truly 
unprecedented degree, businesses of all 
types are clamoring for a way to utilize 
it, and companies are responding.  In 
the January 2014 issue of the New York 
Review of Books, Alice Marwick reports an 
entire “database marketing” industry 
has arisen that is devoted to “collecting, 
aggregating, and brokering personal 
data.”12  Marwick describes a firm that:
[C]reates profiles, or digital dos-
siers, about millions of people, based 
on the 1,500 points of data about 
them it claims to have.  These data 
might include your education level; 
how many children you have; the type 
of car you drive; your stock portfo-
lio; your recent purchases; and your 
race, age, and education level.
Such digital dossiers are sold to 
retailers who use the information to 
“hyper-personalize” their marketing 
efforts to specific consumers.13 Some 
companies have used the “phenomenon 
of hyper-personalization” to categorize 
“users into neatly defined clusters based 
on their search history, buying behavior 
and social trending.”14 In other words, 
commercial entities can identify indi-
viduals or groups of individuals based 
on their behavior patterns gleaned 
from data in cyberspace. 
The Weaponization of “Big 
Data”. Historically, developments in 
commerce and industry tend to make 
their way into the conduct of war.  The 
availability of “Big Data” and the tools 
to analyze it present a real opportu-
nity for governments to use “off-the-
shelf technologies” to enhance their war 
fighting ability.  
One obvious opportunity is to build 
databases of potential opponents’ mili-
taries that could be so detailed as to 
include electronic dossiers of individu-
al members.  The capability may already 
exist: according to press reports, the 
NSA collects millions of facial images 
each day for use in a sophisticated facial 
recognition program.15 Consider the 
recent allegation that Chinese hack-
ers stole thousands of personnel files 
on U.S. government workers.16 Such 
information together with other data 
and technologies could be exploited 
during conflicts to personalize the 
means and methods of warfare to a 
wholly new degree.  
It is critical to understand that cyber-
derived data does not sit in isolation 
from other developing technologies. 
One technology that achieved signifi-
cant prominence in recent years is the 
It appears that in the not-too-distant future, the 
U.S. military will be able to launch swarms of drones 
of drones equipped with facial recognition software... 
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use of remotely-piloted aircraft com-
monly known as “drones” to engage in 
long-term surveillance of battlefields 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, 
and to attack enemy fighters wherever 
found.  Militaries around the world see 
the potential of these aircraft, and over 
the next decade spending on drones 
could top $89 billion worldwide.17 
While issues exist regarding the cur-
rent generation of drones’ survivability 
against sophisticated opponents, there 
will no doubt be further improvements 
that could permit them to operate in 
contested air environments.  Further-
more, published reports reveal that the 
U.S. military is developing a generation 
of small drones capable of operating 
in networked groups, or “swarms.”18 
Other reports suggest efforts to devel-
op lethal micro-drones that “resem-
ble winged, multi-legged bugs” which 
“swarm through alleys, crawl across 
windowsills, and perch on power lines” 
as they seek their target.19 
Parallel to the rapid development of 
drone technology is the swift advance 
of facial recognition software.20 The 
linkage of the two in the context of “Big 
Data” was virtually inevitable.  In 2013 
the Associated Press, in a story pro-
vocatively entitled, “Drones With Facial 
Recognition Technology Will End Ano-
nymity, Everywhere,” explained that 
given the growing ubiquity of drones 
linked to massive databases:  
[C]yber experts believe it’s only a 
matter of years — and research dol-
lars — until computers can identify 
almost anyone instantly.  Comput-
ers then could use electronic data to 
immediately construct an intimate 
dossier about the person, much of 
it from available information online 
that many people put out there 
themselves.
The military sees the potential of 
these capabilities. Popular Science reports 
the U.S. Army is developing drones 
that can recognize people at a distance 
and in crowds.21 The Army is also seek-
ing to develop a “system [that] would 
integrate data from informants’ tips, 
drone footage, and captured phone 
calls” so “a human behavior model-
ing and simulation engine” could spit 
out “intent-based threat assessments of 
individuals and groups.”22 
 
Warfighting Implications. What 
does this “cocktail” of cyber technol-
ogies mean for warfighting?  Quite 
simply, it appears that in the not-too-
distant future, the U.S. military - and 
likely other militaries - will be able to 
launch swarms of drones equipped with 
facial recognition software to roam bat-
tlefields looking for very specific mem-
bers of an enemy’s force.  These could 
be officers, but also selected technicians 
and battle-hardened leaders who pos-
sess vital and difficult-to-replace skills.
Of course, militaries have long 
sought to ‘decapitate’ their enemies’ 
forces.  During the Revolutionary War, 
General Daniel Morgan, the com-
mander of Morgan’s Rifles (an elite 
group of sharpshooters) employed a 
“hyper-personalization” methodology 
that some considered “dishonorable.”23 
Morgan and his unit “would hide and 
target British officers and Indian guides 
that the British sent out to scout out 
the land.”24 Although controversial, “it 
was effective” as it “would often send 
the British Army into chaos.”25 Send-
ing an army into chaos though hyper-
personalized attack is a valued capability 
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in any era. 
Drones are widely used today, but 
what is contemplated here is swarms of 
drones – hundreds, if not thousands. 
This would be a substantially more 
robust operation than the relatively 
modest, ongoing but limited effort to 
use drones to attack “senior operational 
terrorist leaders.”26 Nevertheless, it is 
instructive that the publicly available 
documents obtained from Osama bin 
Laden’s compound during the raid that 
killed him express much concern about 
the damage done by drones.  As one 
official put it, correspondence from 
an Al Qaeda field commander com-
plained “that their guys were getting 
killed [by drones] faster than they could 
be replaced.”27 
What makes hyper-personalized war 
potentially so effective is not simply 
its ability to cripple military force by 
eliminating key personnel, but the psy-
chological effect it could have on the force 
as a whole.  One of the things that sus-
tains soldiers in the crucible of combat 
is their relationship with others in their 
unit.  This bonding process – the pro-
verbial “band of brothers” – provides a 
shield against the psychological isola-
tion of the battlefield.  Otherwise, the 
extreme stress of combat can morph 
into fear, then panic, and even flight.  
Hyper-personalized war alters this 
calculation by overtly targeting par-
ticular individuals; it makes it very clear 
that certain unit members – primarily 
the leadership cadre but also critical 
technicians and experts – are much 
more at risk than others.  To some 
extent this is always been the case in war; 
however, the convergence of technolo-
gies in the 21st century accentuates and 
facilitates it in an unprecedented way.
Furthermore, history shows that cer-
tain weapons have tapped into primal 
human instincts in a way that con-
jures up a dislocating fear that is out 
of proportion to their actual effect. 
For example, the taboo regarding gas 
weapons seems to have originated in 
the “innate human aversion to poison-
ous substances.”28 Similarly, it might 
be said the hyper-personalization of 
war taps into the primal fear of being 
hunted.29 This adds to the psychological 
disorientation that hyper-personalized 
war can inflict on modern armies.
Hyper-personalization of war also 
removes one of the chief “palliative 
techniques” that soldiers use to deal 
with combat stress: denial.30 Essen-
tially, the individual appreciates the 
danger of the situation but still believes 
that although others around him may 
become casualties, “the worst will never 
happen to [them]” personally.31  Obvi-
ously, when an adversary has the ability 
to personalize the threat – and per-
haps even communicate it directly – 
that fragile coping mechanism becomes 
inadequate.
The notion of wide scale - yet per-
sonal - contact with individuals of an 
opposing force is not without prec-
edent.  In fact, an early version of the 
hyper-personalization of war occurred 
before the start of the war against Iraq 
in 2003.  U.S. forces dispatched thou-
sands of personal e-mails to “Iraqi 
military officers warning them to aban-
don their positions and vehicles so not 
to suffer harm.”32 
Another opportunity to create psy-
chological damage on an opponent’s 
force was suggested in a 2001 article by 
Christopher C. Joyner and Catherine 
Lotrionte.  They pointed out how ter-
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rorists and criminals could:
“[D]ivert finds from bank computers 
and corrupt data in databases, caus-
ing disruption or panic” and “steal 
and disclose confidential personal, 
medical or financial information, 
as a tool of blackmail and extortion, 
and cause widespread social disrup-
tion or embarrassment.”33 
Today’s “Big Data” capabilities would 
allow these examples to be converted 
into a means and method of warfare to 
be used not just by groups of terror-
ists and criminals, but also by armies 
in an effort to distract enemy troops 
from their war fighting focus.  Such an 
operation could include, for example, 
widespread hacking of various cyber-
space accounts of individual deployed 
soldiers and their families.  
Knowing that an adversary could 
focus their efforts in such a personal-
ized way could itself inflict psycho-
logical trauma.34 Daniel Ventre records 
a 2007 incident in Denmark where 
“opponents of Western armed forces in 
their interventions” identified this vul-
nerability.  He explained that Muslim 
extremists had “tried to intimidate fam-
ilies of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan” 
by contacting them directly.  According 
to Ventre, this event “triggered a strong 
worry amongst the Danish.”35   
Ventre relates that the Mus-
lims achieved this effect by hacking 
email accounts, and by “intercepting 
cell phone calls between soldiers in 
Afghanistan and their families.”  It cer-
tainly seems possible that today a bel-
ligerent, and particularly one with state 
resources, could replicate this type of 
cyber-enabled – yet hyper-personalized 
- exploitation on a much wider scale.
Legal and Policy Implications. 
Does the hyper-personalization of 
war offend legal or ethical regimes? 
The short answer seems to be, gen-
erally, “no”.  Developing a means to 
focus an attack on individual mem-
bers of an enemy force is not unlaw-
ful; it is not, for example, an ille-
gal form of assassination as many 
seem to believe.36  In his 1989 U.S. 
Department of Defense memoran-
dum about Executive Order 12333 
(a Presidential directive about poli-
cies concerning intelligence activi-
ties, including assassination) Hays 
Parks, one of the nation’s foremost 
experts on the law of armed conflict, 
detailed why killing individual ene-
my combatants in war is not “assas-
sination” as understood in common 
parlance.37 
Parks draws a sharp distinction 
between peacetime and wartime kill-
ings.  “Peacetime assassination,” he 
What makes hyper-personalized war poten-
tially so effective is not simply its ability to cripple 
military force by eliminating key personnel, but the 
psychological effect it could have on the force as a 
whole.
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says, “would seem to encompass the 
murder of a private individual or 
public figure for political purposes” 
something international law pro-
hibits irrespective of an Executive 
Order.38 However, the killing of 
combatants in war is a very different 
matter.  Parks points out that as a 
matter of international law “the role 
of the military [in wartime] includes 
legalized killing” and that combat-
ants “are liable to attack at any time 
or place.”39    
An individual combatant’s “vul-
nerability to lawful targeting,” Parks 
observes, “is not dependent upon his 
or her ‘military duties, or proximity 
to combat as such’.”40  Furthermore, 
any lawful weapon or technique can 
be used. Parks cites a number of his-
torical examples, including the 1943 
downing of a Japanese aircraft car-
rying Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. 
Accordingly, a cyber-empowered 
technique that permits hyper-per-
sonalization of war could be lawfully 
employed against individual bellig-
erents.
Furthermore, the consensus 
among international lawyers is that 
non-state actors in a bona fide 
armed conflict who organize them-
selves into armed groups engaged 
in continuous combat operations 
against other similar armed groups 
or nation-states are subject to indi-
vidualized attack on the same basis as 
members of traditional, uniformed 
militaries, as long as they perform a 
“continuous combat function.”41  
Of course, international law pro-
hibits making targets of civilians not 
directly involved in hostilities.  Pro-
tocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions 
calls upon the parties to distinguish 
“between the civilian population 
and combatants in between civilian 
objects and military objectives.”42 
Protocol 1 further directs the parties 
to a conflict “shall direct operations 
only against military objectives.”43  
Consequently, civilians “enjoy 
general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations.”44 
Additionally, international law pro-
vides that “acts or threats of violence 
the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among civilian pop-
ulation are prohibited.” However, 
this prohibition does not exempt 
civilians from all consequences of 
war.
For example, international law 
only considers “attacks” as cyber 
operations that are “violent“ - that 
is, designed to cause death, injury 
or significant damage.45 A cyber-
operation that is purely psychological in 
nature – such as propaganda - may 
‘target’ civilians so long as it does 
not aim to “incite the population to 
commit crimes.”46   
Hacking a civilian’s e-mail system during armed 
conflict to direct a propaganda e-mail personally to 
him or her does not violate the law of war…
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Along these lines, hacking a civil-
ian’s e-mail system during armed 
conflict to direct a propaganda 
e-mail personally to him or her does 
not violate the law of war (although it 
may violate domestic law).47 Even if a 
personalized email threatens to tar-
get a son or daughter who is serving 
in the armed forces unless the family 
fails to take steps to actively oppose 
the war, it is unlikely that such action 
would violate international law.  It 
is permissible to attack or threaten 
to attack a bona fide combatant as, 
presumably, the actively deployed 
military family member would be.
In contrast, an email that threat-
ened an action violating the law of 
war would indeed violate interna-
tional law.  For example, it would be 
unlawful to threaten to kill or kidnap 
a civilian family member not directly 
participating in hostilities.  Fur-
thermore, international law pro-
hibits targeting a civilian object not 
being used for military purposes.48  
This would mean that a cyber 
“operation” (as the term is used in 
Protocol 1) designed to hack into 
a civilian’s personal bank account 
or medical records (as Joyner’s 
and Lotrionte’ article hypothesizes 
criminals or terrorists might do) 
would be illegal under international 
law. Indeed, targeting the personal 
property of a combatant is likewise 
typically a breach of the law because 
it is not necessarily part of a proper 
military objective.
Conclusion. The emergence of 
cyber-enabled “hyper-personalized” 
war raises a variety of issues for 21st 
century democracies.  For instance, 
what effect will it have on military 
recruitment and retention, partic-
ularly in the growing number of 
countries like the US that rely on 
all-volunteer militaries?  Adversar-
ies’ abilities  to literally “reach out 
and touch” particular individuals 
could adversely affect the mindsets 
of individuals who otherwise would 
be disposed to serve in the military, 
as well as “influencers” of military 
service, such as parents, spouses, and 
friends.49 
Moreover, there are a nearly end-
less number of scenarios where 
adversaries could hyper-personalize 
conflict via cyber means.  Enemy 
agents could track the online hab-
its, school schedules, and other 
activities of servicemembers’ chil-
dren and employ data-mining and 
other cyber-techniques to pinpoint 
them.  This information could then 
be used to plot all kinds of actual 
malevolence against their children, 
or to simply craft very precise threats 
toward their families.  In either case, 
enormous anxiety would be generat-
ed among the troops about the safety 
of their loved ones.  It would make 
it almost impossible for soldiers to 
focus on warfighting duties. 
This scenario also shows that the 
hyper-personalization of war, par-
ticularly through the exploitation 
of open-source information, may 
disadvantage democracies and oth-
er open societies simply because it 
would be easier to build the database 
of targets.  While it is probable that 
even the relatively few remaining 
truly closed societies (like North 
Korea) will eventually be obliged to 
provide their peoples with access to 
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the Internet, it is readily conceivable 
that freer societies where individuals 
are almost fully unconstrained about 
the sharing of personal information 
would obviously be more vulnerable.
Another dark side of the hyper-
personalization of war is that the 
cyber technologies that enable it are 
not especially unique to the United 
States or other advanced democra-
cies.  In most instances, they are 
available on the commercial market. 
In the hands of the totalitarian or 
repressive regimes - something that 
is virtually inevitable – these capa-
bilities would facilitate the identifi-
cation and elimination of dissidents.
At the same time, combatants 
waging hyper-personalized war who 
also observe the law could aid in 
shielding innocents from the conse-
quences of conflict.  Not only might 
the application of force be limited to 
bona fide belligerents, even within 
that group only a select few might 
need to be targeted.  Narrowing the 
number of combatants at risk, and 
limiting (or even eliminating) many 
of the dangers to civilians might 
ameliorate some of the horror of 
war.  Recently, the Israelis illus-
trated another risk-limiting hyper-
personalization technique when they 
called the personal cell phones of 
Gaza civilians to warn them that the 
building they were occupying was 
about to be bombed.50 
Finally, it cannot be over-empha-
sized that hyper-personalized war 
is not necessarily the only, or even 
most likely, form of “cyberwar” that 
we could see in the 21st century. 
Still, acknowledging and preparing 
for the inventive application of cyber 
capabilities occasioned by the rise 
of “Big Data” and all that comes 
with it is vital.  Absent doing so, 
we may find ourselves suffering not 
the “cyber Pearl Harbor” that Mr. 
Panetta fears, but another one with 
consequences equally as serious con-
sequences.
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